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ous attempt at escaping condemnation of
the act on grounds of prior restraint. The
opinion failed to recognize how section
70.7, providing for one showing before the
board could censor a film, avoided the constitutional bar of prior restraint. The Court,
citing Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago3' and Near v. Minnesota,3 2 conceded
that not all prior restraint is unconstitutional and recognized the need for certain
exceptions. While the issue of prior restraint formed the basis of the majority
opinion, the dissents recognized that the act
31365 U.S. 43 (1961).
32 283 U.S. 697 (1931).

Textbooks for Parochial Schools
The Supreme Court of Oregon, in the
recent case of Dickman v. School Dist. No.
62C,1 was called upon to decide the constitutionality of a statute which stated that:
[E]ach district school board shall .. .provide textbooks, prescribed or authorized by
law, for the free and equal use of all pupils
residing in its district and enrolled in and
actually attending standard elementary
schools ....2
In accord with this statute public funds
were expended to provide textbooks, for
students in both public and parochial
schools. A taxpayer sought to enjoin a
school board "from supplying textbooks
without charge for the use of pupils enrolled in ...a parochial school ....,,3
The
Court held that this expenditure was for'-Ore.
2

-, 366 P.2d 532 (1961).
ORE.REV. STAT. § 337.150(1)

3Dickman

(1957).

v. School Dist. No. 62C, - Ore.-,
336 P.2d 533, 534-35 (1961).
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made such a discussion an unrelated issue.
The legislature was aware of this problem,
and had attempted to escape involvement
by providing for an initial showing prior to
a board determination.
The difficulties involved in enacting censorship statutes are very apparent in the
instant case. The Pennsylvania legislature
took precautions to avoid the constitutional
pitfalls to which similar legislation had
fallen victim- yet the act was stricken
down. An inescapable question has thus
been created: What guides can a legislature
utilize when drafting censorship statutes so
as to be reasonably certain that the courts
will sustain them?

bidden by the Oregon constitution, which
provides: "No money shall be drawn from
the Treasury for the benefit of any religeous
[sic], or theological institution. .... -4
The Dickman decision illustrates the
conflict which often arises when legislation
aimed at benefiting education indirectly
confers a benefit upon sectarian institutions. In the past, courts have upheld such
legislation by relying on either the "remuneration" or the "child benefit" theory.
According to the "remuneration" 5 the4 ORE. CONST. art. I,

§ 5.
5 St. Hedwig's Industrial School for Girls v. Cook
County, 289 111. 432, -, 124 N.E. 629, 631 (1919);
Murrow Indian Orphans Home v. Childers, 197
Okla. 249,-, 171 P.2d 600, 601-03 (1946); State
ex rel. Atwood v. Johnson, 170 Wis. 251,-, 176
N.W. 224, 228 (1920). The Murrow case distinguished the cases based on a remuneration theory
from those involving the use of public money to
provide transportation for pupils to parochial
schools on the ground that in the latter cases
the state received no value for its money. But see
Gurney v. Ferguson, 190 Okla. 254, 122 P.2d

1002 (1941).
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ory, religious institutions may properly be
reimbursed for the performance of nonreligious services, such as the care and
feeding of orphans, for which the state
would in any event be responsible. However, some courts have rejected this theory
and have stated that the religious institution benefits from payments made for services as well as from outright donations, and
that the one benefit is no more constitutional than the other.6 This theory was
summarily rejected by the Court in the
instant case. 7
The "child benefit" theory is usually relied upon by the courts which uphold the
use of state funds to supply textbooks or
transportation for students in parochial
schools. According to this theory, the funds
are used for the benefit of the child and,
therefore, do not constitute aid to the institution which he attends." It has been said
that this theory answers the objections historically raised in opposition to providing
books and transportation for parochial
school students: (1) that the funds are
used for a private rather than a public
purpose, 9 and (2) that they constitute
state support of religion. These objections
would seem to be rebutted by the fact that
the funds expended for transportation1 0
6 Cook County v. Chicago Indus. School for Girls,
125 Il1. 540,-, 18 N.E. 183, 191 (1888); Synod
of Dakota v. State, 2 S.D. 366, -, 50 N.W. 632,
635 (1891). See Cushman, Public Support of
Religious Education in American Constitutional
Law, 45 ILL. L. REV. 333, 337 (1950).
7 Dickman v. School Dist. No. 62C, supra note 3,
at -, 366 P.2d at 542-43.
8 See Borden v. Board of Educ., 168 La. 1005, -,
123 So. 655, 660-61 (1929).

9 The requirement that the state may only levy

taxes to raise money for a public, as opposed to a
private, purpose was established by the Supreme
Court in Loan Association v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655

and schoolbooks 1' are spent for the public
purpose of educating children in general.
Further, since the funds are specifically
appropriated for the children's benefit the
aid runs directly to them, as opposed to the
12
religious institutions which they attend.
Those who have rejected the "child benefit" theory have reasoned that schools
cannot function without books and pupils;
when the state undertakes to provide both
books and transportation for students in
sectarian institutions it is materially aiding
the schools. 13 The net effect of such action
is to "build up, strengthen and make successful the schools as organizations."'1 4 It
has also been argued that where the state
provides a service, such as education, and
makes it equally available to all its citizens,
money spent to duplicate this service is
spent for a private, not a public, purpose.' 5
The problem presented by the use of
state funds to provide services for students
in parochial schools has been considered
11 Borden v. Board of Educ., supra note 8, at

-,

123 So. at 660-61.
12 Ibid. Cf. Bowker v.Baker, 73 Cal. App. 2d 653,
-, 167 P.2d 256, 262-63 (1946); Chance v. Mississippi State Textbook Bd., 190 Miss. 453, -,200
So. 706, 713 (1941).
13 Judd v. Board of Educ., 278 N.Y. 200, 211-15,
15 N.E.2d 576, 582-83 (1938). This case held unconstitutional a law providing public funds for the
transportation of pupils to private and parochial
schools. At the present time, however, art. XI, § 4
of the state constitution specifically authorizes
such expenditures. See also Gurney v. Ferguson,
190 Okla. 254, 122 P.2d 1002 (1941); Mitchell v.
Consolidated School Dist., 17 Wash. 2d 61, 135
P.2d 79 (1943). In Gurney the court pointed out
that school funds may only be used for school
purposes and thus no support is legal except that

which aids the school. Therefore, a fortiori, school
bus service for parochial school students must

10 Nichols v. Henry, 191 S.W.2d 930, 934-35 (Ky.

similarly aid the sectarian institution.
14 State ex rel. Traub v. Brown, 36 Del. 181,-,
172 At. 835, 837 (1934).
15 Board of Educ. v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314, -, 199

1945).

Atl. 628, 638 (1938) (dissenting opinion).

(1874).
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by the United States Supreme Court. In
Cochran v. Board of Educ.16 the Court
held that a Louisiana statute which provided textbooks for students in both public
and private institutions did not violate the
fourteenth amendment's prohibition against
taxation for a private purpose. The Court
found that the state received a benefit when
it supplied free school books to children.
Similarly, in Everson v. Board of Educ.'7
the Court upheld the use of state funds to
reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their children to both parochial and
public schools. Both these decisions apparently adopted the "child benefit" theory,
which the instant case rejected.
In the Dickman case the Court based its
decision on a section of the Oregon constitution which prohibited the use of state
funds for the benefit of religious institutions.' 8 The Court said that this section
proclaimed separation of church and state
to be the public policy of Oregon.' 9 The
question was whether the distribution of
textbooks for the use of parochial school
20
students was a violation of this policy.
The Court first considered the contention that the expenditure constituted aid to
the students rather than to the schools. It
rejected this argument on two grounds:
first, since all funds spent on education
ultimately inure to the benefit of the child,
16281 U.S. 370 (1930).
17 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
18 Dickman v. School Dist. No. 62C, - Ore. , ,
366 P.2d 533, 542 (1961). The Court stated that

since the statute in question violated art. I, § 5 of
the Oregon constitution there was no need to consider whether it violated the first (aid to a religious
institution) or the fourteenth amendment (imposing a tax for a "non-public" purpose) of the federal constitution. Nor did the Court find it
necessary to consider whether it violated art. VIII,
§ 2 of the Oregon constitution.
19 Id. at -, 366 P.2d at 537.
20 Id. at-, 366 P.2d at 538.
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this theory would justify the use of public
funds to pay all the costs of parochial education; 21 secondly, since school funds may
only be used for school purposes, no support is legal except that which aids a
school. 22 Therefore, any expenditure for
textbooks supplied for the use of parochial
students must necessarily aid the parochial
school.
Having concluded that these expenditures were in fact aid to the parochial
school, the Court went on to consider the
question from the viewpoint of separation
of church and state. It conceded that such
separation does not prevent the state from
extending to religious institutions certain
benefits, such as fire and police protection,
which are also conferred on other members
of the community. 23 "The proscription is
against aid to religious functions. ' 24 Thus,
in light of the fact that Catholic schools
"permeate the entire educational process
with the precepts of the Catholic religion,"'25 the Court concluded:
[W]here the aid is to pupils and schools the
benefit is identified with the function of education and if the educational institution is
religious, the benefit accrues to, religious
institutions in their function as religious
26
institutions.
Having disposed of the principal theory
upon which the legislation before it might
have been sustained, the Court went on to
dispose of several other possible defenses.
It indicated that even if the supplying of
textbooks could be considered legislation
for the general welfare, the Oregon constitution precluded the legislature from proId. at -, 366 P.2d at 539-40.
Id. at-, 366 P.2d at 540.
23 Id. at-, 366 P.2d at 542-43.
21
22

24 Ibid.

25 Id. at-, 366 P.2d at 536.

26 Id. at -, 366 P.2d at 543-44.
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moting the general welfare in this manner. 27 In the same vein, it held that the
supplying of textbooks is not an acceptable
way of facilitating the enforcement of the
compulsory school attendance laws. 28 With
regard to the "remuneration" theory, the
Court dismissed as "specious" the idea that
29
the state was paying for services rendered.
It is to be noted that the Court in the
instant case recognized that much of its
reasoning was at variance with that contained in the Supreme Court's decision in
Everson v. Board of Educ.30 The state was
allowed to pay for transportation to parochial schools because it was done to promote the health and safety of children in
the Everson case. However, the Dickman
opinion endeavored to distinguish Everson
on the ground that supplying textbooks was
clearly an expenditure for education rather
than for the general welfare.3 1 Further, it
indicated that in any event it would not
have followed Everson had the case not
32
been distinguishable.
The dissenting opinion in the instant
case took an entirely different approach
from the majority. It did not concern itself
with whether the state's funds ultimately
benefited the school, and, if so, whether
the benefit accrued to it in its religious
27
28
29
30
31

Id. at-, 366 P.2d at 541.
Id. at-, 366 P.2d at 542.
Id. at-, 366 P.2d at 542-43.
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Dickman v. School Dist. No. 62C, - Ore.

366 P.2d 533, 540-41 (1961).
32 Id. at-, 366 P.2d at 540-41, 545.

-

-

function. Rather, it made legislative intent
the test of constitutionality, Applying this
test it found that in the present case the
legislative intent was to improve the quality of education by supervising the quality
of the books used in the schools and that
there was no intent to aid religious schools.
Thus, it concluded that the statute was
3
constitutional. 3
Both the majority and the dissenting
opinions in this case broke new ground
with the tests of constitutionality which
they proposed. The dissenting opinion's
"legislative intent" test is probably more
liberal than any of those applied in the
past. The majority's test, which forbids any
state action which ultimately benefits a religious institution in its religious character
appears to be more conservative than either
the "child benefit" or the "remuneration"
theory. It remains to be seen whether either
will find favor with the courts of the other
states or with the Supreme Court, should
it be called upon to reconsider its opinion
in the Everson case. If other courts see fit
to adopt the majority's test the probable
result will be the closing off of the trickle
of public money now being diverted to students in private schools. On the other
hand, if they choose to follow the path suggested by the dissent, the result may be a
new era in which public money will be used
to provide better educational opportunities
for all children, without a requirement that
they attend state operated schools.
33

Id. at -, 366 P.2d at 545-47.

